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IV 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(g) as this 
is an appeal from a final judgment and order in a domestic 
relations action. Therefore, jurisdiction is appropriate. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from an Order and Judgment of the 
Seventh Judicial District Court of Emery County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, presiding, entering a Decree of 
Divorce in favor of the Plaintiff/Respondent,, awarding custody of 
the children to the Plaintiff/Respondent, and a division of 
property favoring the Plaintiff/Respondent. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce appealed from were entered on November 5, 1987 and 
mailed to the Defendant/Appellant on Novembeir 10, 1987. 
Defendant/Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal on the 7th day of 
December, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arises out a divorce action that was heard 
on the 30th day of September, 1987 before the Honorable Boyd 
Bunnell, District Court Judge. (Findings of Fact, Addendum "A", 
f,FFn, Introductory paragraph, Record on Appeal "RA" 072-080) 
(a) The Appellant and Respondent were husband and 
wife, having been married on the 29th day of, December, 1973 in 
Green River, Utah. (FF paragraph 2, RA 073) 
(b) The parties had four (4) children, to wit: LANCE 
RANDALL ERWIN (born July 16, 1976), STACEY ANN ERWIN (born July 
1, 1979), KARA BROOKE ERWIN (born May 20, 1981), and NICHOLAS 
CHARLES ERWIN (born January 11, 1984). (FF paragraph 3, RA 073) 
(c) During the marriage the parties acquired a home 
and real property in Green River, Utah with an approximate value 
of $50,000 and liens against the home totaling approximately 
$45,500. (FF paragraph 11, RA 076) 
(d) The parties also acquired a one-half interest in a 
corporation which was valued by the Court at $50,000. (FF 
paragraph 11, RA 076) 
(e) The business acquired by the parties was a 
construction business and until March, 1986 the Respondent spent 
substantial time working in said business. (I Trans. 12, RA 112) 
(f) In March, 1986, the Respondent obtained employment 
in Arizona and for a short period of time traveled back to Green 
River, Utah every other weekend to be with his family. (I Trans. 
89, RA 189) 
(g) In or about May, 1986, the family and minor 
children moved to Arizona. (I. Trans 89, RA 189) 
(h) The parties had family difficulties while in 
Arizona and returned to Green River, Utah in August, 1986. 
Shortly thereafter, the family returned to Arizona. (I Trans. 
89-92, RA 189-192) 
(i) The parties were unable to work out their marital 
2 
difficulties and Respondent returned to Green River, Utah with 
three of the minor children, Lance, Stacey, and Nicholas. (I 
Trans. 96-105, RA 196-205) 
(J) Appellant was left in Arizona with the minor 
child, Kara and Appellant remained in Arizona for approximately 
two months. She returned to Green River, Utah in December, 1986. 
(I Trans. 238-242, RA 338-342) 
(k) After a Court hearing in February, 1987, two of 
the minor children, Kara and Nicholas, were in the temporary 
custody of Appellant and the other two minor children, Lance and 
Stacey, remained in the family home with the respondent. (RA 
020-022) 
(1) From that time until the hearing on September 30, 
1987, the children were brought together approximately every 
other weekend with the exception that the minor child, Lance, 
refused to visit with his mother, the Appellant. (I Trans. 244-
246, RA 334-346) 
(m) A Custody Evaluation was performed and dated May 
19, 1987 in which it was recommended that the two minor children 
that were currently with the Appellant remain with the Appellant 
and that the two minor children currently with the Respondent 
remain with the Respondent. (Custody Evaluation Addendum C) 
(n) At the hearing on the 30th of; September, 1987 the 
Court ordered that custody of all four minor children should be 
awarded to the Respondent. (FF paragraph 8, RA 075) 
(o) The Trial Court also ordered that the Appellant 
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receive limited visitation of one weekend per month and holidays 
as outlined in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (FF 
paragraph 8, RA 075) 
(p) The Trial Court also ordered the family home 
awarded to the Respondent with no equity interest for the 
Appellant, awarded the business interest to the Respondent, and 
ordered all interest in the pension fund of approximately $18,000 
to the Respondent. The Appellant was awarded the sum of $12,000 
as her interest in the business and equity in the home, however, 
this was to be paid out at the sum of not less than $200 per 
month at 6 percent interest. Appellant was also awarded the Ford 
Bronco, valued at $9,500, free and clear of any indebtedness 
thereon. (FF paragraphs 11 and 12, RA 076-078) 
(q) Appellant was not ordered to pay child support due 
to her unemployed status. (FF paragraph 18, RA 080) 
Respondent was ordered to pay all the marital debts of 
the parties including the first and second mortgages on the 
marital home, debts in the sum of approximately $5,000, and the 
indebtedness on the Ford Bronco in the sum of approximately 
$10,000. (FF paragraph 12, RA 077-078) 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
(a) Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
awarding custody of the minor children to the Respondent, based 
upon the testimony presented and the recommendations of the 
custody evaluator. 
(b) Whether the Trial Court failed to make adequate 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav; to support its decision 
to award custody of the minor children to the Respondent. 
(c) Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
awarding the property of the parties as follows: 
(1) The Trial Court awarded the full pension 
benefits to the Respondent. 
(2) The business interest was ordered paid over 
a substantial period of time at an inadequate interest 
rate. 
(d) Whether the Trial Court failed to make adequate 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for its distribution of 
property. 
(e) Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
limiting the Appellant's visitation. 
(f) Whether the Trial Court failed to make adequate 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to its order limiting 
Appellant!s visitation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant in this case is contending that the Trial 
Court abused its discretion and/or failed to make adequate 
Findings of Fact in basically three separate areas: Custody, 
distribution of marital assets and visitation. 
Appellant is questioning the determination of custody, 
particularly in that the Trial Court failed to make Findings of 
Fact regarding her ability to care for the children and failed to 
take into account the custody evaluation. The case law in Utah 
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is quite clear regarding the necessity for Findings of Fact. 
Appellant submits that if Findings of Fact were made by the Trial 
Court regarding the custody evaluation and her ability to care 
for her children, the Trial Court would have had to make an award 
of split custody with the Respondent receiving custody of the two 
older children and the Appellant receiving custody of the two 
younger children. 
Appellant is contesting the Trial Court's distribution 
of assets. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the Trial Court 
abused its discretion in awarding the full pension benefits to 
the Respondent. There is nothing in the Trial Court's Findings 
of Fact to support an award of this nature. In fact, while the 
Court did set a value on each marital asset, it failed to show 
how the distribution of that asset affected the overall marital 
estate. 
Appellant also contends that the Court allowed a payoff 
of $200.00 per month on a $12,000.00 cash settlement and that 
this was abuse of the Trial Court's discretion. There are no 
Findings regarding the necessity of an installment payoff and 
there are no Findings to support the dollar figure used. The 
Appellant claims that the Court should have awarded the statutory 
rate of interest of twelve percent (12%) on any installment 
payout rather than the six percent (6%) the Court did award. 
The Trial Court awarded custody of the four (4) minor 
children to the Respondent with visitation to the Appellant. The 
visitation was limited to one weekend per month, some holidays 
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and one month in the summer. Appellant questions this limited 
visitation in that there is no evidence and no Findings to 
support limiting her visitation with the minor children. The 
Appellant asserts that the Trial Court should have awarded her 





THE GENERAL RULE APPLICABLE IN DIVORCE CASES IS 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS BROAD DISCRETION, BUT THE 
DISCRETION IS SUBJECT TO ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT 
SO THAT THE APPELLATE COURT CAN MAKE THE PROPER REVIEW. 
In this case, the Trial Court clearly has discretion 
given it by law. In a myriad of cases, the courts have indicated 
that the Trial Court is the place to adjudicate domestic matters. 
This is "because the proper adjudication of custody matters 'is 
highly dependent upon personal equations which the Trial Court is 
an advantaged position to appraise'", Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 
423,425 (Utah 1986) citing Johnson v. Johnson, 323 P.2d 16, 19 
(Utah 1958). The Utah Supreme Court and Appellate Courts have 
indicated that they will not overturn a Trial Court's 
determinations in a custody matter or in any other domestic 
matter unless the appellant can show a misapplication of the 
facts of that the Trial Court misapplied principals of law, 
Smith, 1986 supra. 
This is a heavy burden for Appellant to carry and 
Appellant understands the difficulty that the Appellate Court has 
in reviewing Trial Court decisions in these matters. However, it 
is incumbent upon the Appellate Court to review such decisions to 
determine that the actions of the Trial Court are supported by 
the weight of the evidence. Even further, the Appellate Court 
must review the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the 
Trial Court and determine that they do in fact support the 
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Court's ultimate conclusion. The Appellate Courts must determine 
not only that the Findings support the Conclusion, but also 
demonstrate why and how that conclusion was reached, Smith, 
supra, see also Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987) 
(regarding findings of fact, conclusions of law and visitation 
issues) and Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1988) (the 
application of findings of fact and conclusions of law and the 
distribution of property). 
This Court then is charged with the obligation not only 
of giving the Trial Court broad discretion and not infringing 
upon that discretion, but to do more than "a superficial exercise 
of judicial power'1, Smith, 1986, supra. The Court must review 
the written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to determine 
that the factors that should be taken into account by the Trial 
Court Judge were (1) in fact taken into account by the Judge and 
(2) properly applied by the Trial Court Judge. 
In the case before us, the Court exercised its 
discretion in believing or not believing certain witnesses and 
evidence. Unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the 
contrary, the Trial Court's interpretation of the facts must be 
allowed, Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985). However, 
the Court still must examine the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law to determine if they logically follow from the Court's 
determination of the facts. 
9 
II 
IN AWARDING CUSTODY OF ALL FOUR MINOR CHILDREN 
TO THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION AND FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF 
FACT SUPPORTING THE AWARD OF CUSTODY. 
In its Memorandum Decision, dated October 9, 1987 
(Addendum "B", RA 056-063), and in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law prepared from that Memorandum Decision, the 
Court indicates that both parties have the necessary physical 
skills to care for the children. At that time, two of the minor 
children were being cared for by the Plaintiff/Respondent and two 
of the minor children were being cared for by the 
Defendant/Appellant. This had been the situation since December 
of 1986. Prior to that time, Appellant had the youngest child in 
her care and Defendant had the three older children in his care 
from approximately October through December of 1986. In its 
Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact, the Trial Court sets 
these facts out clearly as to the Respondent, but fails to set 
out any facts in regard to the Appellant. 
Throughout its Memorandum Decision and Findings of 
Fact, the Trial Court sets forth the efforts made by the 
Respondent, but fails to indicate any efforts made by the 
Appellant in caring for the children. This is contrary to the 
evidence that was presented. It is impossible to refer the Court 
to every place in the transcript which would indicate testimony 
regarding the care for the children; however, Appellant would 
submit that testimony is contained in Volume 1, Day 1, Pages 98-
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250 (RA 198-350) and almost the entire text of the transcript of 
Volume 2, Day 2 (RA 351-468). Much of this testimony regarding 
Appellant's care for the children is uncontradicted and 
unrebutted; however, the Trial Court failed to even make mention 
of it. 
The Trial Court also indicates that the Appellant left 
the minor child unsupervised or with limited supervision. This 
testimony is controverted. However, Appellant recognizes that 
the Trial Court has the discretion to determine which witnesses 
are credible. There is no indication either in the Findings of 
Fact or Memorandum Decision that this concern about the child 
carried over into the time period from December, 1986 until the 
decision of the Trial Court. The Trial Court also set forth 
numerous factors that it took into account regarding the two 
minor children that were residing with the Respondent, its 
determination regarding the Respondent's ability to care for the 
children and the care that he had provided. Again, there is 
simply no mention as to the two minor children in the custody of 
the Appellant. 
Appellant asserts that the failure of the Trial Court 
to take into account the care received by the two children in her 
custody and her ability to care for them during the time period 
in question is a clear abuse of discretion. Obviously, if the 
Trial Court had determined that the children were not properly 
cared for, well adjusted or for some other reason were not 
appropriately cared for by the Appellant during this time period, 
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it would be within the Trial Court's discretion to make said 
determination based upon suitable Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. However, the Court simply ignored this and 
made no mention of these two children, either in its Memorandum 
Decision or its Findings of Fact. To fail to make a decision and 
then simply transfer custody based on the care received by the 
other two children is an abuse of discretion and shows no 
reliance upon the evidence presented. 
It is difficult not to interweave the argument 
regarding Findings of Fact with abuse of discretion since, due to 
the way this matter was decided, they are inextricably 
interwoven. The judgments made by the Trial Court as stated 
above are contained in its Findings of Fact and in its Memorandum 
Decision. The Appellate Courts have given the Trial Courts a 
great deal of discretion in determining what evidence is credible 
and, therefore, absent the clear preponderance as cited in 
Berger, supra, the Appellant cannot challenge the Court's 
determination as to the credibility of witnesses. However, as 
set forth in Section I, it is incumbent upon the Trial Court to 
set forth adequate Findings of Fact to support its conclusion. 
Appellant asserts that that is not the case in this decision. 
The Appellant does, however, attack one finding of the 
Court as being unsupported by the evidence. In its Finding of 
Fact number 4, the Court finds that Appellant "had affairs with 
other men while the parties were living with the children in the 
State of Arizona." Appellant asserts that there was no testimony 
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based upon personal knowledge at the trial and, therefore, in the 
transcript which supports this conclusion. There was speculative 
evidence, innuendo and heresay, but no admissable evidence was 
presented regarding this finding. The Court's determination of 
custody may or may not turn on that single item, but Appellant 
must bring this to the attention of the Appellate Court. 
In its Findings, in paragraphs 4 and 6, the Court 
apparently relies on certain factors to make a determination of 
custody. The Court reiterated Respondent's testimony regarding 
the Appellant's activities in Arizona. However, there was no 
showing that the instability the Court was concerned about 
continued after December of 1986 when the Appellant was awarded 
temporary custody of the two younger children. There v/as no 
testimony presented regarding lack of supervision or limited 
supervision of these two children. Rather, the Court sets forth 
the activities in Arizona as an example of the Appellant's 
previous poor judgment, but sets forth no Findings as to any 
continued poor judgment or lack of care of the minor children. 
The Court does indicate that the Appellant "moved in with and 
began to live with another man and that she continues to this 
time to live with him with said two children and does so openly." 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 4). 
It would seem that, even though the Court does not set 
forth the reasons in its Findings, that Appellant's relationship 
with this individual is a substantial basis for the Court's 
failure to continue the existing custodial relationship. In 
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Sanderson v. Tyron, 739 P.2d 623, 625 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court determined that "an extra marital sexual 
relationship is insufficient to justify a change in custody.11 In 
this case, the Court goes so far as to rule that a polygamist 
relationship alone is not a sufficient basis to take custody from 
the individual living in the polygamist relationship. 
The Court determined that an individual sexual relationship, 
absent some showing of adverse effect upon the children, was not 
sufficient as a factor for an award of custody. This position is 
further supported in case law in Fontenot v. Fontenot, 714 P.2d 
1131 (Utah 1986); Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985) and 
Stuber v. Stuber, 244 P.2d 650 (Utah 1952). 
The Court really doesn't set forth its reasons for 
making these Findings and the effect that these Findings had on 
its determination of custody. However, based upon the language 
of the Memorandum Decision and the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, one has to assume that it had a substantial 
effect. As set forth above, this is inappropriate. 
In making its Findings of Fact, the Court also failed 
to indicate what, if any, effect the custody evaluation (Addendum 
ffCfl) had upon its determination. While itf s true that the Court, 
in its sound discretion, need not consider certain evidence, in 
this case, the Court clearly had the custody evaluation before it 
and under consideration, see Transcript, Volume 1, Day 1, Page 3 
(RA 103). This custody evaluation was ordered by the Trial Court 
(Para 7, RA 022), prepared in May of 1987 and submitted to the 
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Court, yet nowhere in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
does the Court indicate that the evaluation was inappropriate or 
that the Court found the recommendation by the evaluator to be 
somehow not worthy of consideration. Again, as in other 
testimony and facts presented, the Court has simply ignored the 
custody evaluation. 
The Respondent did present testimony of one Rebecca 
Semken regarding her opinion about the custody evaluation that 
had been performed by another individual. There was a 
substantial amount of testimony presented beginning on Page 17 3 
of Volume 1, Day 1 of the Trial Transcript (RA 273)- This 
testimony goes through page 192 (RA 292). Throughout the 
testimony, the witness basically contradicts the custody 
evaluator's recommendation of splitting custody of the children 
and placing the older child with Mr. Erwin and the three 
younger children with Mrs. Erwin, the Appellant. However, it is 
also clear from the testimony that Ms. Semken never interviewed 
the Appellant or the two minor children in the care of the 
Appellant, Transcript Volume 1, Day 1, Page 178, 184 (RA 278, 
284) . 
In Walker v. Walker, 707 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985), the 
Court determined that the use of an evaluator or the testimony of 
an evaluator who did not interview the whole family was an abuse 
of discretion. Again, the Court's Findings of Fact are 
incomplete in regard to the Court's use of either custody 
evaluator. In that the Court followed the recommendation of Ms. 
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Semken and apparently ignored the recommendations of Mrs. 
Scartezini, one can only assume that the Court relied upon the 
testimony of Ms. Semken in disregarding the written evaluation. 
Based on the test in Walker, supra, this would clearly be an 
abusive discretion. 
This is further supported by the Courtfs finding that 
the children should be kept together. (Paragraph 7 Findings of 
Fact). At a previous hearing the Court awarded temporary custody 
of two of the children to each of the parties. Mrs. Scartezini 
in her evaluation recommended continuing that arrangement while 
Ms. Semken discouraged it. Again, because of the inadeguate 
findings, this Court is left to guess as to the Trial Court's 
reasoning in ignoring the custody evaluatior^. 
The Appellant does not contend that the Trial Court has 
no discretion in using or not using a custody evaluatorfs 
recommendations, see Fletcher v. Fletcher, 616 P.2d 1218 (Utah 
1980), but the Plaintiff does believe that, if a custody 
evaluation is performed, the Court should make a finding as to 
its effect, if any. If the custody determination is so complex 
that the evaluation is ignored or only becomes a part of that 
determination, the Trial Court is required to issue specific 
findings to that effect. 
While it may not be the best of all situations, split 
custody is often more favorable than other alternatives. In this 
case, the two older children had resided with the Respondent 
since December of 1986 and the younger children had resided with 
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the Appellant for the same period of time. Based upon this, the 
custody evaluator recommended split custody. The Utah Supreme 
Court has, on several occasions, approved a split custody 
determination. In Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 
1979) the Court said: 
"While it is true that a child custody award 
that keeps all the children of the marriage 
united is generally preferred to one which 
divides them between the parents, that 
preference is not binding in the face of 
considerations dictating a contrary course of 
action", at 512. 
In this case, the Court found both parents to be fit 
custodial parents. A split custody arrangement was also approved 
by the Court in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986). In 
Pusey, supra, there was a preference expressed by one child. In 
this case, the two younger children are too young to have 
expressed such a preference; however, the Court in Pusey 
indicated other factors to take into account, these being the 
identity of the primary caretaker during the marriage, identity 
of the parent with greater flexibility to provide personal care, 
identity of the parent with whom the child has spent most of his 
or her time during the pending custody determination, if that 
period has been lengthy, and the stability of the environment 
provided by each parent. There is no indication from the 
Findings of Fact or the Memorandum Decision that the Trial Court 
applied these factors to the two children in the custody of the 
Appellant during the pendency of this action. 
The Trial Court has the obligation in its findings not 
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only to indicate its ultimate conclusion, but also must "show why 
the ultimate conclusion it reaches is justified", Smith (1986), 
supra, citing Milne Truck Lines v. Public Service Commission, 636 
P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981); Elwel v. Board of Education, 626 P.2d 460 
(Utah 1981). In custody determinations, these findings are 
critical in that "proper findings of fact ensure that the 
ultimate custody award follows logically from and is supported by 
the evidence and the controlling legal principals," Painter v. 
Painter, 80 UAR 14 at 15 (Utah App. 1988) citing Smith v. Smith, 
726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). Therefore, it is not necessary, 
or it should not be necessary, for an Appellate Court to try and 
guess the basis for the Trial Court's Findings of Fact. In this 
situation, there are no Findings of Fact in regard to the ability 
or lack thereof of the Appellant to care for the children. In 
making such a determination, the Court shoulp. look to "the 
particular needs of the child and the ability of each parent to 
meet those needs," Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 996 (Utah 
1986), citing Smith, supra and Hutchinson v. Hutchinson/ 649 P.2d 
38 (Utah 1983) and that was not done in this case. 
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Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND FAILED 
TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT IN THE DIVISION 
OF MARITAL PROPERTY. 
As stated above, the Trial Court is granted a great 
deal of discretion "in adjusting the financial interest of 
parties to a divorce . . . [and] absent some clear abuse of 
discretion, the Trial Court's distribution of marital assets and 
liabilities will not be disturbed, Painter v. Painter, supra at 
14, citing Cook v. Cook, 739 P.2d 90, 93 (Utah App. 1987). The 
Appellant realizes that the burden in disputing the distribution 
of marital assets is upon the Appellant, but believes that the 
Court abused its discretion in the awarding of assets. 
Appellant contest two specific portions of the Trial 
Court's awarding of assets. The Trial Court abused its 
discretion and failed to make proper Findings of Fact in awarding 
the entire pension fund to the Respondent and in allowing the 
Respondent to pay the $12,000.00 awarded to Appellant at the rate 
of $200.00 per month and six percent (6%) interest. 
In order to adequately review a distribution of 
property in a divorce proceeding, the Appellate Court must not 
only review the issues complained of, but must also review all 
other issues. "It would be inappropriate for this Court to 
reverse on an isolated item of property or debt distribution, 
rather this Court must examine the entire distribution to 
determine if the Trial Court abused its discretion11, Boyle v. 
Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah App. 1987). Therefore, in 
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reviewing the Court's Findings of Fact, the Appellate Court must 
look to each issue of the distribution. Further, in Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), the Court stated that the 
Findings of Fact had to include a value placed upon each asset or 
debt in order for the Court to properly review the distribution. 
In the present case, while the Trial Court set a value on each 
aspect of the distribution, it made no Findings of Fact as to hov/ 
those valuations fit together in the entire scheme of the 
distribution. For example, Appellant was awarded $12,000.00 as 
her interest in the business and in the home, together with the 
Bronco, with a value of approximately $9,500.00. Respondent was 
ordered to pay the encumbrance on the Bronco in the sum of 
approximately $10,000.00, but was awarded the full rights in the 
pension fund. Taking Jones, supra, only slightly further, the 
Trial Court should set forth the basis for the award of each item 
in order to properly allow the Appellate Court to review. 
In Colman v. Colman, 67 UAR 7, 12 (Utah App. 1987), the 
Court, in quoting Jones , supra and Boyle, supra, states "However, 
to determine if equity was done we must have before us specific 
findings of fact pertinent to that issue." That was not done in 
this case. As stated above, there were no Findings of Fact to 
support the pay out over a period of time and at the interest 
rate indicated. There was also no indication by the Trial Court 
of how each portion of the property distribution fit into the 
overall scheme of the distribution of marital assets. 
Since Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982) and 
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Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court has recognized that both spouses have a share in either 
spouse's retirement fund. This retirement fund, based on the 
previously cited cases, is an asset of the marriage and, 
therefore, any distribution, future or present, of the asset must 
be accounted for. In the present case, the Court awarded the 
entire pension fund to the Respondent. As stated above, the 
Court made no findings as to how each share of the marital estate 
was distributed. The Court did include the value of each asset 
and, based upon testimony given, the Court may determine that 
value, however improper it may seem. As to the retirement fund, 
the Court made no determination regarding the time of 
distribution of the fund, the method of distribution, the future 
value versus the present value and how this retirement fund 
affected the overall distribution. 
In Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1987), the 
Court discussed in detail the procedure in determining the 
distribution of a pension fund. In this case, the Court found 
that the pension fund had little or no present value and, 
therefore, awarded it to the Respondent. In the Bailey case, the 
Court indicated the importance of findings in the Court's 
exercise of its discretion. Again, this Trial Court has failed 
to make specific findings regarding the distribution of the 
pension fund, other than it apparently has no immediate value, 
see Findings of Fact, paragraph 11(d). There is no indication in 
the Court's findings as to why the fund is not readily available. 
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In paragraph 12(f) the Trial Court found that the Respondent 
should have the sole retirement fund "in order to provide for 
himself and the children.11 If the retirement fund truly had no 
readily available value then it would certainly not be available 
for the Respondent to use to provide for himself and the 
children. These two findings seem to be contradictory and, 
therefore, an abuse of discretion. 
The Trial Court awarded Appellant $12,000.00 as her 
cash settlement for her interest in the business and any equity 
interest she might have in the parties1 home. While the 
Appellant doesn't agree with the value the Court placed on the 
assets, Appellant recognizes that the Court does have the 
discretion to determine that valuation based upon the testimony 
presented. Rather, the Appellant questions the Court's order 
that that amount be paid at the rate of $200.00 per month at six 
percent (6%) interest. 
In Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987), 
the court found that it was reversible error for the Trial Court 
to not award the statutory interest rate. In the Marchant case, 
the Trial Court ordered that any sums to be paid on the 
retirement account would accrue interest at the rate of eight 
percent (8%) per annum. The Court of Appeals reversed and held 
that the Trial Judge had erred in not awarding interest on the 
property award in an amount of twelve percent (12%) per annum. 
Appellant submits that the same factors involved in the Marchant 
decision are involved in this case and that it is reversible 
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error for the Trial Court to allow the payment of the property 
settlement at $200.00 per month and six percent (6%) interest. 
There is no specific finding by the Trial Court to 
justify the payment sum of $200.00 per month. Appellant submits 
that the Marchant decision deals with the Courtfs award of six 
percent (6%) interest and, therefore, this distribution should be 
set aside and a more equitable distribution ordered. 
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IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETldN AND FAILED 
TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT IN LIMITING 
APPELLANT'S VISITATION WITH THE MINOR CHILDREN. 
In this case, the Trial Court awarded custody of all 
four minor children to the Respondent. The Appellant has set 
forth her contentions regarding that custody award. Nonetheless, 
the issue of visitation is significant since this matter may go 
on for a lengthy period of time or the custody award may be 
upheld. 
Without some basis, the Trial Courj; should grant the 
non-custodial spouse reasonable visitation. Any visitation 
granted to a non-custodial parent should be "realistic and 
reasonable and provide an adequate basis for preserving the 
child's relationship with the non-custodial parent", Ebbert v. 
Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah App. 1987). The general rule 
in Utah is that reasonable visitation includes every other 
weekend, alternate holidays and an extended summer visitation. 
In this case, the Trial Court granted the Appellant one weekend 
per month, some holiday visitation as outlined in the Findings, 
and only one month of extended summer visitation. There are no 
Findings to support the limit the Court imposed on Appellant's 
visits. 
Clearly, in determining the visitation, the Court must 
look to the best interests of the children. However, absent 
Findings to the contrary, the Court should gjrant the non-
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custodial spouse reasonable visitation. There is no apparent 
reason for the Court to limit Appellant's visitation. Again, the 
inadequate Findings of Fact by the Trial Court must leave the 
Appellate Court guessing as to the reason for limited visitation. 
This Court should remand the issue of visitation for further 





The Appellant seeks relief from the Trial Court's 
decision in this matter. In all issues presented, the Appellant 
seeks reversal of the Trial Court's decision with remand for 
further hearing with instructions from the Appellate Court 
regarding the issues presented. 
Regarding custody, the Trial Court gave no indication 
in its Findings of Fact as to how its Conclusions were reached. 
It appears that substantial testimony was not discounted or found 
to be not credible, but rather was plainly ignored. This 
constitutes an abuse of discretion in the decision made by the 
Trial Court. In addition, this case reguires remand for the 
Court to issue proper Findings of Fact in regard to the custody 
determination. 
Based upon existing case law, it is clear that the 
interest rate attached to the cash property settlement is 
inappropriate. The Court should reverse that aspect of the 
Decree and impose the statutory twelve percent (12%) interest 
rate. However, the question of the payout at $200.00 per month 
must still be resolved. The issue should be remanded to the 
Trial Court for further hearing with instruction from this Court 
on the payout amount over time. 
There is absolutely no reason for the Trial Court to 
have limited Appellant's visitation with thq minor children. It 
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may well be that the Trial Court did not want to impose upon the 
Respondent and require him to transfer the children to Salt Lake 
more than once per month. However, the Trial Court can deal with 
that problem and at the same time not limit Appellant's 
visitation. There is absolutely nothing in the Trial Court's 
Findings which support the limitation on visitation. One can 
only guess at the reasons why the Trial Court imposed this 
limitation, but guessing is not the function of the Appellate 
Court. 
As can be seen, there are numerous issues in this case 
that need to be resolved. The Appellant requests that the 
Appellate Court reverse the issues presented and remand the case 
back to the Trial Court with specific instructions regarding the 
necessary Findings for custody, the distribution of property and 
removing the restrictions on Appellant's visitation. 
Respectfully Submitted this / day of August, 1988. 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Joane P. 
White, Attorney for Respondent, 5th Street Plaza, 475 East Main, 




ADDENDUM "A" Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Oliveto Building, Suite 4 
23 South Carbon Avenue 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR, EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KIRK RANDALL ERWIN, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
VALERIE ANN ERWIN, 
Defendant, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No.4868 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the C ourt on the 30th day of September, 1987, the Honorable 
Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge, presiding; and, the Plaintiff 
having been personally present and represented by his counsel, 
Joane Pappas White; and, the Defendant having been personally 
present and represented by her counsel, George M. Harmond, Jr.; 
and, the Court having heard evidence and received exhibits and 
having taken this matter under advisement and having been fully 
advised in the premises now finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Plaintiff is an actual and bona fide 
resident of Emery County, State of Utah and has been for more 
than three months immediately next prior to the commencement 
of this action. 
2. That the Plaintiff and the Defendant were married 
on the 29th day of December, 1973 at Green River, Emery County, 
Utah and have been husband and wife since that time. 
3« That there have been four children born as the 
issue of this marriage, namely, Lance Randall Erwin, born July 
16, 1976; Stacie Ann Erwin, born July 1, 1979; Kara Brook Erwin, 
born May 20, 1981 and Nicholas Charles Erwin, born January 11, 
1984. 
4. The Court finds that both of the parties have 
exhibited the necessary physical skills to properly care for 
and take care of the children's physical needs and that both 
are fit and proper parents in this regard; however, the Court 
finds that the Defendant has exhibited a certain amount of 
instability and used poor judgment in her relationship with 
the children in that she had affairs with other men while the 
parties were living with the children in the state of Arizona; 
that after the separation of the parties, the Defendant left 
the child Kara, who remained with the Defendant in Arizona, 
either unsupervised or with limited supervision while she worked 
and a time when the child was approximately five years of age; 
that after the Defendant returned to Utah and received two of 
the children into her custody, that she moved in with and beaan 
to live with another man and that she continues to this time, 
to live with him with said two children and does so openly; 
that there has developed, for whatever cause, a complete 
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alienation of the feelings of her oldest son so that she has 
had no visitation or meaningful parental relationship for over 
a year, and that he has stated that he does not want to visit 
with or have anything to do with his mother. 
5. The Defendant and her live-ih boyfriend are both 
unemployed but state that they are seeking employment in the 
Salt Lake area where they are presently residing. 
6. The Plaintiff has provided a stable environment 
for the two children that he has had in his care since December 
of 1986 and that he was the sole provider for three of the 
children from October through December of 1986 and has been 
the sole provider for the two children in his custody from 
December of 1986 until the present. The Court finds that he 
is now occupying the home where the children have resided for 
the majority of their life; that he has the benefit of support 
of his parents and other family members in the Green River area 
where he is residing; that the two children are residing with 
him are happy and content and well adjusted in that environment; 
that the Plaintiff is self employed and has a good income and 
can provide the necessary economic means for the support of 
the children and that he has the support of his parents who 
live next door to him to help him in assisting with the raising 
of the children during times when he works; and, that he has 
demonstrated a constant desire and concern for the welfare of 
the children for the period of over one year that the parties 
marriage has been in a crisis situation. 
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7. The Court further finds that the children, if 
at all possible, should remain together as a family unit. 
8. The Court finds that it is in the best interests 
of the four minor children of the parties that their care, custody 
and control be awarded to the Plaintiff subject to the right 
of the Defendant to visit the children at reasonable times and 
places including but not limited to the following: 
A. The Defendant shall be entitled to take the 
children for visitation purposes on the second weekend of each 
month from 5:00 p.m. on Friday until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday; and 
B. The Defendant is allowed to take the children 
on December 26, 27 and 28 of each year for Christmas visitation; 
and 
C. That the Defendant be allowed to take the children 
on Mother's Day weekend from Friday until Sunday; and 
D. That the Defendant be allowed to take the children 
on Friday and Saturday of each Thanksgiving weekend; and 
E. That the Defendant be allowed to take the children 
every other Easter weekend from Friday until Sunday, commencing 
in 1988; and 
F. The Defendant is also allowed to take the children 
for one month during the summer vacation time provided that 
the Defendant select said month and give notice of same to the 
Plaintiff on or before May 1 of each year designating the time 
for said one month sumrrer visitation; and 
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9. The Court finds that each of the parties should 
cooperate and work together to try and re-establish a parental 
relationship between the oldest son and the Defendant and that 
the parties should work in that direction and exert their best 
efforts to re-establish that relationship. 
10. The Court finds that the Defendant has treated 
the Plaintiff cruelly causing him great mental distress and 
suffering. 
11. The Court finds that the parties have acquired 
certain real and personal property during the marriage and that 
said property should be valued as follows: 
A. The Court finds that the parties have acquired 
real property in Green River, Utah that has an approximate value 
of $50,000.00 and that they owe $35,500.00 on the first mortgage 
and $10,000.00 on the second mortgage against said property. 
B. The parties have further acquired a Bronco 
automobile that has a value of approximately $9,500.00 and against 
which is owing the sum of $10,000.00. 
C. The Court further finds that the parties have 
accumulated an interest in a business that is a corporation, 
of which the parties own one half, and that the total business 
interest is worth approximately $50,000.00 and that its only 
value as a going business concern is subject to the provision 
that the Plaintiff and the other stockholders devote their full 
time and energy to the business to keep it as a going concern, 
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and that it has little value if the business were to be 
liquidated. The Court further finds that the parties have a 
one-third interest in a corporation known as San Rafael Land 
Development Company but that that company has little present 
market value since it was organized to develop land and that 
land has now only speculation value and that that corporation 
showed a net operating loss for the period of 1985 to 1986 of 
a minus $280.25. Based upon the exhibits shown, the Court finds 
that San Rafael Land Development Company has no present economic 
value. 
D. The Court further finds that the parties have 
an investment in a retirement fund in the approximate sum of 
518,489.06 which is not readily available for the use of the 
parties at this time. 
E. The Court further finds that the parties have 
accumulated substantial debts other than the debts owed on the 
home and the Bronco in the approximate sum of $5,809.38. 
12. Based upon said finding of value, the Court awards 
said property as follows: 
A. To the Defendant rhe Bronco automobile, free 
and clear of all claims of the Plaintiff and free and clear 
of all debts and obligations. The Court orders the Plaintiff 
to assume and pay the outstanding indebtedness owed for the 
Bronco. 
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B. The Court further orders that the Plaintiff pay 
to the Defendant the sum of $12,000.00 as Defendant's share 
of the equity in the home and business arid that the Plaintiff 
pay the Defendant this amount in the sum of at least $200.00 
per month, commencing with the month of November, 1987 and that 
said cash settlement shall bear interest at the rate of 6% per 
annum on the unpaid balance with the interest to be deducted 
from each payment and then the balance applied to principle. 
The Plaintiff shall have the right to pay the Defendant the 
full amount of this indebtedness at any time and the Defendant 
shall be given a lien against the real property to secure the 
payment of said indebtedness. 
C. The Plaintiff is awarded the home and real property 
for his use and the use of the children, subject to all 
outstanding indebtedness owed thereon. 
D. The Plaintiff is awarded the parties' interest 
in the business and corporations, subject to all indebtedness 
owed thereon. 
E. The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay all 
other debts owed by the parties and incurred and listed on their 
financial statements as marital debts. 
F. The Plaintiff is awarded any and all interest 
which the parties may have in the retirement fund in order to 
provide for himself and the children. 
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G. The Plaintiff shall be awarded all of the household 
furniture and fixtures and other personal property now in his 
possession except that the Defendant is awarded the old living 
room set, the stereo, the 19" televsion set, the afghan that 
she made, one half of the slides and pictures of the children, 
the piano which the Defendant had prior to this marriage, the 
kitchen items that were given to her as gifts consisting of 
a set of pans, a crock pot, a pressure cooker, cookbooks and 
cookie sheets and the Defendant shall be awarded one half of 
the bedding and sheets not used on the beds of the children 
or for the children's use. 
13. The Court further orders that the Plaintiff pay 
to the Defendant to assist her with payment of the balance of 
the attorney!s fees the sum of $350.00 and that said payment 
be made to the Defendant with sixty (60) days from the entry 
of the Decree in this matter. 
14. The Court further orders that the two children 
now in the custody of the Defendant, namely, Nicholas Charles 
Erwin born January 11, 1984 and Kara Brook Erwin, born May 20, 
1981, be turned over to the Plaintiff at the conclusion of their 
school activities on October 16, 1987 and that all of their 
personal clothing and personal items be delivered to the Plaintiff 
along with the children on that date. 
15. The Court further orders that the Plaintiff shall 
deliver the children to the Defendant on the weekends and dates 
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when Defendant is entitled to visitation and that the Defendant 
shall be responsible to return the children to the Plaintiff 
at the conclusion of each visit. 
16. The Plaintiff is ordered to maintain medical, 
dental and optical insurance for the benefit of the minor children 
of the parties when he is employed with an employer who offers 
such insurance as a benefit of his employment. The Plaintiff 
is further ordered to pay all reasonable medical, dental and 
optical expenses incurred on behalf of the minor children which 
are not covered by a policy of insurance. 
17. No alimony is awarded herein. 
18. The Court finds that the Defendant is unemployed 
at the current time and, therefore, no child support is awarded. 
19. The Plaintiff has sustained the allegations of 
his Complaint by adequate evidence. 
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of 
Fact now concludes as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff is granted a divorce from 
the Defendant. 
2. That the Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody 
and control of the four minor children of the parties, subject 
to Defendant's rights to visit said children pursuant to paragraph 
8 of the Findings of Fact and the subdivisions thereof. 
3. No alimony is awarded herein. 
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4, No child support is awarded herein. 
5. The property and debts accumulated by the parties 
during the marriage is distributed pursuant to paragraph 11 
of the Findings of Fact and the subdivisions thereof. 
4. The Plaintiff is ordered to maintain medical, 
dental and optical insurance for the benefit of the minor children 
of the parties when he is employed with an employer who offers 
such insurance as a benefit of his employment. The Plaintiff 
is further ordered to pay all reasonable medical, dental and 
optical expenses incurred on behalf of the minor children which 
are not covered by a policy of insurance. 
5. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay to the Defendant 
the sum of $350.00 to assist the Defendant with her costs and 
attorney's fees in this matter and to pay same within sixty 
(60) days from the entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter. 
6. The Court orders the Defendant to turn over to 
the Plaintiff the two minor children Nicholas Charles Erwin 
and Kara Brook Erwin, following the conclusion of their school 
activities on October 16, 19P7 together with all of their personal 
clothing and personal items. 
7. The Court orders that the Plaintiff shall deliver 
the children to the Defendant on weekends and dates when she 
is scheduled for visitation and that the Defendant shall be 
responsible to return said children to the Plaintiff at the 
conclusion of each such visits. 
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8. The Court orders that each of the parties cooperate 
and work toward trying to re-establish a parental relationship 
between the parties' oldest son Lance and the Defendant and 
orders the parties to work in that direction and to exert their 
best efforts to re-establish said relationshij 
DATED this day of October, 19 
HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
c on this C^f- ^Z -"" day of I do hereby certify that _j, t 1987, I mailed a true and jcorrect copy of the 
above and foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, postage 
prepaid to the Defendant, Valerie Ann Erwin, addressed as follows: 




Secretary to Mrs. White 
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ADDENDUM "B" Memorandum Decision 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KIRK RANDALL ERWIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
VALERIE ANN ERWIN, ] 
Defendant. ) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 4853 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the 
Court on the 30th day of September, 1987, and the parties 
( 
appeared in person and presented evidence and exhibits and 
witnesses for the Court's consideration and the Court took this 
matter under advisement and rules as hereinafter stated: 
The Court finds that the defendent has treated the 
plaintiff cruelly causing him mental suffering and distress and 
therefore grants a divorce to the plaintiff and against the 
defendant. 
Tiie Court finds that both of the parties have 
exhibited the necessary physical skills to properly care for 
and take care of the childrens1 physical needs, and that both 
are fit and proper parents in this regard. However, the Court 
finds that the defendant has exhibited a certain amount of 
instability and used poor judgment in her relationship with the 
children in that she had affairs with other men while the 
parties were living with the children in the state of Arizona; 
that after the separation of the parties, she left the child 
that remained with her in Arizona either unsupervised or with 
limited supervision while she worked and at a time when the 
child was approximately five years of age; that after she 
returned to Utah and received two of the children in her 
custody, that she moved in with and began to live with another 
man and that she continues to this time to live with him with 
the two children that are in her custody, and does so openly; 
that there has developed, for whatever cause, a complete 
alienation of the feelings of her oldest son so that she has 
had no visitation or meaningful parental relationship with him 
for over a year, and that he has stated that he does not want 
to visit with or have anything to do with his mother. 
The defendant and her live-in boyfriend are both 
unemployed but state that they are seeking employment in the 
Salt Lake area where they are presently residing. 
The plaintiff has provided a stable environment for 
the two children that he has had in his care since December of 
1986, and that he was the sole provider for three of the 
children from July until December of 1986, and has been the 
sole provider for two of the children since that time to the 
present. The Court further finds that he is now occupying the 
home where the children have resided for a majority of their 
life; that he has the benefit of support of his parents and 
other family members in the Green River area where he is 
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residing; that the two children who are residing with him are 
happy and content and well adjusted in that environment; that 
the plaintiff is self-employed and has a good income and can 
provide the necessary economic means for the support of the 
children, and that he has the support of his parents who live 
next door to him to help him in assisting with the raising of 
the children during the time that he works; and, that he has 
demonstrated a constant desire and concern for the welfare of 
the children for the period of over one year that the parties 
marriage has been in a crisis situation. 
The Court further finds that the children, if at all 
possible, should remain together as a family unit. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court 
has concluded that it is in the best interest of the children 
that their care, custody and control be awarded to the 
plaintiff subject to the right of the defendant to visit the 
children at all reasonable times and places* 
The Court further orders that the defendant shall be 
entitled to take the children for visitation purposes on the 
second weekend of each month from 5:00 p.m. on Friday until 
6:00 p.m. on Sunday, and that she shall be further allowed to 
take the children on December 26, 27 and 28 of each year for a 
Christmas visit, and that she shall be allowed to take the 
children on the Mother's Day weekend from Friday until Sunday, 
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and on Friday and Saturday of each Thanksgiving weekend, and 
every other Easter weekend from Friday until Sunday, commencing 
in 1988. She shall further be allowed to take the children for 
one month during the summer school vacation time, and that she 
shall select the month that she shall have the children and 
givenotice to the plaintiff on or before May 1 of each year of 
the time that she intends to take the children. 
The Court further orders that each of the parties 
cooperate and work toward trying to re-establish a parental 
relationship between the oldest son and the defendant, and that 
the parties work in that direction and exert their best efforts 
to re-establish that relationship. 
The Court finds that the parties have acquired a 
home and real property in Green River, Utah, that has an 
approximate value of $50,000 and that they owe $35,500 on the 
first mortgage and $10,000 on a second mortgage against the 
property. The parties have further acquired a Bronco 
automobile that has a value of approximately $9,500 and against 
which there is owing the sum of $10,000. 
The Court further finds that the parties have 
accumulated an interest in a business that is a corporation, of 
which the parties own one half, and that the total business in-
terest is worth approximately $50,000 and that its ownly value 
as a going business concern is subject to the provision that 
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the plaintiff and the other stockholders devote their full time 
and energy to the business to keep it as a going concern, and 
that it has little value if the business were to be liquidated. 
The Court further finds that the parties have a one-third 
interest in a corporation known as the San Rafael Land 
Development Company, but that that company has little present 
market value since it was organized to develop land and that 
that land now has only speculation value, and that that 
corporation showed a net operating loss for the period 1985 to 
1986 of $280.25. Based upon the exhibits shown, the Court 
finds that this corporation has no present economic value. 
The Court further finds that the parties have an 
investment in a retirement fund in the approximate sum of 
$18,489.06 which is not readily available for the use of the 
parties at this time. 
The Court further finds that the parties have 
accumulated substantial debts other than the debts owed on the 
home and the Bronco in the approximate sum of $5,809.38. 
Based upon these findings, the Court awards to the 
defendant the Bronco automobile, free and clear of all claims 
of the plaintiff, and orders the plaintiff to pay and assume 
the outstanding debt owed on the Bronco so that she will 
receive this asset free and clear of any debt. 
The Court further orders that the plaintiff pay to 
the defendant the sum of $12,000 as her share of the equity in 
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the home and the business, and that he pay her this amount in a 
sum of at least $200 per month commencing with the month of 
November, 1987, and that said cash settlement shall bear 
interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the unpaid balance with 
the interest to be deducted from each payment and the balance 
applied to principal. The plaintiff shnl] have the right to 
pay her the full amount of this indebtedness at any time, and 
the defendant shall be given a lien against the real property 
to secure the payment of this indebtedness. 
The plaintiff shall be awarded the home and real 
property for his use and the use of the children, subject to 
all outstanding indebtednesses owed thereon, and, further, he 
shall be awarded the parties1 interest in the business and 
corporations, subject to all indebtednesses owed, and the 
plaintiff shall further assume and pay all the other debts owed 
by the parties and incurred and listed on their financial 
statements, and the plaintiff shall be awarded any and all 
interest they have in the retirement fund for his use and the 
use of the children. 
The plaintiff shall be av/arded all of the household 
furniture and fixtures and other personal property now in his 
possession except that the defendant shall be awarded the old 
living room set, the stereo, the 19" television set, the afghan 
that she made, one half of the slides and pictures of the 
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children, the piano that she had prior to this marriage, the 
kitchen items that were given to her as gifts consisting of a 
set of pans, the crockpot, pressure cooker, cookbooks and 
cookie sheets, and the defendant shall be awarded one half of 
the bedding and sheets not used on the beds of the children or 
for the childrens1 use. 
The Court further orders that the plaintiff pay to 
the defendant to assist her with the payment of the balance of 
her attorney's fees the sum of $350 and that said payment be 
made to her within 60 days of the entry of the Decree. 
The Court will further order that the two children 
now in the custody of the defendant be turned over to the 
plaintiff at the conclusion of their school acitivites on 
October 16, 1987, and that all of their personal clothing and 
personal items be delivered to the plaintiff along v/ith the 
children on that date. 
The Court further orders that the plaintiff shall 
deliver the children to the defendant on the v/eekends and dates 
that she is to commence visitation and that the defendant shall 
be responsible to return the children to the plaintiff at the 
conclusion of each visit. 
The Court hereby directs that the attorney for the 
plaintiff prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a 
Decree in accordance with this decision. 
DATED this Cf'^ day of October, 1987. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I mailed true and correct 
copies of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION by depositing the 
same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following : 
Joane P. White 
Attorney at Law 
23 South Carbon Avenue 
Price, Utah 84501 
George M. Harmond, Jr. 
JENSEN LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys at Law 
190 North Carbon Avenue 
Price, Utah 84501 




ADDENDUM "C" Custody Evaluation 
FINDINGS OF CUSTODY EVALUATION 
May 19, 1987 
Re: Kirk Randall Erwin 
vs. 
Valerie Ann Erwin 
Civil No. 4868 
This report is submitted in compliance with a court order 
dated February 24, 1987, requesting that I conduct an evaluation 
of the Erwin family in order to provide the court with information 
that would be useful to it in deciding which of the Erwin parents 
should have custody of their children Lance, Stacie, Kara and 
Nicholas. 
My findings and recommendations are based on the parents seen 
conjointly and individually. Home visits were made to each 
parent's residence at a time all four children were present 
(with the exception of Lance—he has been unwilling to visit 
with his mother). The children were observed in interaction 
with family members and were also interviewed privately at both 
households. In addition, telephone and/or personal contacts 
occurred between the time frame of April 1 to May 13, 1987, with 
the following persons: 
Mrs. Betty Bastain, friend of Mrs. Erwin 
Mrs. Chris Spadafora, friend of Mrs. Erwin 
Mrs. Charlotte Seely, friend of Mrs. Erwin 
Dr. Ralph Vanderlinden, therapist for Mrs. Erwin 
Dr. Lynn Ravsten, therapist for Mr. & Mrs. Erwin 
Mr. J. D. Banasky, friend of Mr. Erwin 
Mrs. Cindy Ekker, friend of Mr. Erwin 
Mr. Morris Quaranberg, partner of Mr. Erwin 
Bishop Larry Rowley, Mr. & Mrs. Erwin's bishop 
Mrs. Durrant, Lance's fifth grade teacher 
Mrs. Quaranberg, Staciefs second grade teacher 
Mrs. Evans, Kara's kindergarten teacher 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION; 
Mr. and Mrs. Erwin were both raised in Green River. They began 
dating after Mr. Erwin completed the service and the summer 
before Mrs. Erwin began her senior year of high school. After 
dating for six months they were married in December, 1973. 
Although Mrs. Erwin reports insecurity and the inability to 
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measure up to Mr. Erwin's expectations, Mr. Erwin describes 
their relationship as very good until about five years ago. 
He reports that after the birth of their third child, Kara, 
he was made aware of Mrs. Erwin1s feelings of being neglected. 
Approximately ten years ago Mr. Erwin began a construction 
business with Mr. Morris Quaranberg. The business was very 
demanding, and Mr. Erwin spent the majority of his time working 
and much of this was spent out of town and away from the family 
for long periods of time. Reportedly, very little time was 
spent with the family, with the child rearing responsibilities 
falling upon Mrs. Erwin. 
In March, 1986, Mr. Erwin obtained employment in Arizona. For 
a few months he would travel home every other weekend. With 
the conclusion of school, Mrs. Erwin and the children moved to 
Arizona in order for the family to be together. Mr. Erwin reports 
that he was happy to have his family with him, but Mrs. Erwin 
states that she felt as though she and the children were in his 
way. She alleges that he would work long hours and very little 
time was spent interacting with the family. Arguments became 
more frequent, and in an attempt to save his marriage, Mr. Erwin 
moved his family back to Green River in August, and he and 
Mrs. Erwin saw Dr. Lynn Ravsten for two sessions. Feeling 
problems may be worked out, the family returned to Arizona. 
Reportedly, Mrs. Erwin soon claimed the marriage was over and 
she no longer cared to continue the relationship. Mr. Erwin 
feels that she was having a relationship; she denies this 
accusation. 
Irregardless, Mr. Erwin announced he was returning to Green River 
and asked Mrs. Erwin which two children she wished to keep in 
her custody because he was taking two with him. She indicates 
she could not choose, so he stated he was leaving with Lance 
and Nick. But before he left he also took Stacie, leaving 
Kara alone with Mrs. Erwin. Mr. Erwin returned to the family 
home in Green River, and Mrs. Erwin remained in Arizona for 
another two months before returning to Green River in December. 
Since the court hearing in February, Mrs. Erwin lives with her 
mother in Green River with Kara and Nick. Mr. Erwin continues 
to live in the family home with Stacie and Lance. Visits are 
alternating every other weekend with the children being brought 
together. The only exception to this arrangement is that Lance 
refuses to visit with his mother. 
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ALLEGATIONS: 
It is Mr. Erwin1s position that his children are his main 
concern. "They are my life." He feels that he can provide the 
children with a "safe and secure environment in the home they 
have been raised in." He alleges that although Mrs. Erwin was 
a good mother/ her parenting attributes changed dramatically. 
He alleges that she failed, during the time she was in Arizona, 
to provide adequate supervision of the children, especially Kara. 
He feels he is more mature and emotionally stable than his wife, 
and better capable of raising the childre)i. 
i 
Mrs. Erwin contends that she has carried most of the responsibility 
for the children's care over the years and that the father has 
not been actively involved in every day aspects of their lives 
because of his involvement in his business. Mrs. Erwin alleges 
that Mr. Erwin was demanding with high expectations for her 
and the children. She reports that he was never affectionate 
with her. She feels that Randy does care for his children, but 
also feels that the time and activities he is presently sharing 
with his children will not continue once custody has been decided. 
EVALUATION OF FAMILY MEMBERS: 
Mrs. Valerie Erwin (Mother) 
Mrs. Erwin was born and raised in Green R|iver, and was the 
youngest of four children. She reports having a warm relationship 
with fond memories of her mother and siblings. Memories of her 
father are not as memorable. It seems that he was an alcoholic 
and her parents were divorced when she was fourteen. Mrs. Erwin 
reports enjoying school. References who knew her in school 
described her as being "shy and lacking in self-esteem. She 
was liked, but did not shine as a leader." She and Mr. Erwin 
were married during her senior year, but she did graduate with 
her classmates. 
The major problems growing up as she described them were "shyness" 
and "insecurity". She married Mr. Erwin sher senior year because 
she was attracted to his competency and strong character. 
Mrs. Erwin presently lives with her mothdr, Mrs. Muriel Smith, 
age 67, in the small two bedroom home shq grew up in. Mrs. Erwin 
acknowledges that this home is not adequate to care for her 
children, nor can she secure adequate employment to raise her 
children in Green River. Her plans, if she receives custody of 
the children, would be to move to Price, with her mother, and 
attend C.E.U., taking classes in business in hopes that she 
might develop marketable skills in a short amount of time to 
support her family. She has already disdussed her educational 
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plans with Ray Maestas, Vocational Rehabilitation. She states 
that financial assistance through the Rehab. Program may be 
available for her education. Mrs. Smith would provide the needed 
daycare while Mrs. Erwin was out of the home. 
Undoubtedly, the children would have to change schools. However, 
in talking with the three teachers, this would not be a difficult 
transition for the children. All of them do exceptionally well 
in school. The changes they made to Arizona and back again 
this past year did not appear to have a negative effect on their 
academic or social adjustment in school. 
Collateral interviewees saw Mrs. Erwin as "quiet, reserved, 
submissive, and dependent". Everyone describes her as a good 
mother always having her home in order and children clean. She 
is described as "being creative, patient, and always with 
her little family". She was never seen as abusive or inappropriate 
in disciplining her children and she always volunteered to assist 
in school and community activities her children were involved in. 
She was described by another as "hard to get to know" and "shy". 
Valerie's best friends were probably her sisters. Another 
referent feels that Valerie's relationship with Randy "lacked 
emotional validation". She is seen as "a happier, more outgoing, 
self-confident person since the separation". 
Mr. Randy Erwin (Father) 
Mr. Randy Erwin is a thirty-six year old contractor who was born 
and raised in Green River. Mr. Erwin reports a good relationship 
with his parents and two sisters. He felt he had to "tow the line" 
Chores were expected to be completed, and the family participated 
in outdoor activities together. Mr. Erwin was active in sports 
during high school and reportedly was "well-liked". Mr. Erwin 
went to college for a short time before joining the Army. After 
completing two years in the Army he returned to Green River and 
began dating Mrs. Erwin. 
They moved to Provo shortly after the marriage in order for 
Mr. Erwin to attend Trade Tech in hopes of learning a trade that 
would allow him to provide a stable financial foundation for 
his family. He returned to Green River and began a construction 
business with his former shop teacher, Mr. Morris Quaranberg. 
Mr. Erwin is presently living in the family home which he built 
seven years ago on property located next to his parents1 home. 
If he were to have custody of the children, he plans to remain 
in the home. The four-bedroom home is very adequate to accommodate 
the family. Mr. Erwin has done an excellent job of caring for 
Lance and Stacie. According to the children he prepares meals, 
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maintains the home, and meets the children's personal needs 
with the assistance of his mother. 
During the home visit, Mr. Erwin interacted very appropriately 
directing the family activity. Positive interaction was 
observed with all four children. They seemed very comfortable 
in the environment. Information gathered would not indicate 
that Mr. Erwin has ever neglected nor been abusive to his children. 
Collateral interviewees describe Mr. Erwin as "a hard worker, 
honest, and a homebody". He is also seen as being "high strung, 
a perfectionist, and a very private individual with few close 
friends". The majority of the collaterals saw Randy as spending 
only a limited amount of time with his family prior to the 
separation. Randy is seen by another collateral as "over-
protective and a worrywart". 
Lance Randall Erwin (D.O.B. July 16, 1976) 
Lance comes across as a mature, intelligent, observant ten-year-
old boy who is feeling a lot of sad feelings over his parent's 
separation. He wishes "his Mom and Dad would get back together". 
Since Lance returned to Green River with his father in October 
he has only visited with his mother on one occasion for one day. 
He is, in part, blaming Mrs. Erwin for the divorce stating 
that he "saw Mom at the swimming pool talking to men". Lance 
is described by his teachers as an excellent student, a leader 
in his class, and an outgoing sports enthusiast. Lance describes 
himself as most happy "when with Dad", and he can always "count 
on Dad". He acknowledges that he and his mother had a close 
relationship for all the years preceding the move to Arizona, but 
he refuses to deal with his feelings concerning Mrs. Erwin at 
this point in time. Lance's room was very clean and orderly 
with baseball posters and his own artistic illustrations decorating 
the walls. Lance feels that his family is very affectionate 
and those feelings are expressed through hugs and kisses. Lance 
verbalizes his desires to stay with Dad, play Little League 
baseball, and help Grandpa Erwin with the watermelons this summer. 
Stacie Ann Erwin (D.O.B. July 1, 1979) 
Stacie, who will be eight in July, is a very sensitive, shy, 
beautiful freckle-face little girl. She is very sad and unwilling 
to discuss family problems surrounding the divorce. Stacie has 
a strong alliance to both parents, speaking only positively of 
both. She does well academically, having attained the top achiever 
status in her class this past quarter. She is well liked by her 
teachers and friends, and is perceived as being a lot like her 
mother was in school. She describes activities as being attended 
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by all family members, including grandparents (on both sides). 
If Stacie had a problem she would go to "Mom and Dad", and if 
she needed to be comforted she would go to "Mom and Dad". 
Stacie is extremely close to her younger sister, Kara. This 
is very apparent in observing and listening to the interaction 
when the two are together. 
Kara Brook Erwin (P. 0. B. May 20, 1981) 
Tomorrow Kara will turn six years old. She is a giggly/ shy, 
darling blond little girl. She giggles and smiles when asked 
questions. She is very spontaneous and excited when discussing 
her animals, especially her dog, Rusty, and the bunnies Stacie 
and Lance received for Easter from Dad. Kara's teacher, 
Mrs. Evans, reports that except for a short period of time when 
the family returned in October, Kara has done well in school. 
During this time she was emotional and cried easily. Kara reports 
that she did not like school in Arizona and was glad to get back 
with her friends and "Stacie". 
Nicholas Charles Erwin (D.O.B. January 11, 1984) 
Nicholas, who is three years old, is well developed physically 
and intellectually. He drew a family picture and recognized 
colors during our conversation. He participated in the structured 
activity with the family members, but also sought the limelight 
by riding his rocking horse when he became bored with the activity. 
During our fantasy game, Nick stated that he would want Mommy 
to join him on the fantasy island. During the home visits Nick 
showed affection equally with each parent. 
IMPRESSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS: 
Interviews with both parents, as well as collaterals, suggest 
that both parents are concerned, caring people. It is the opinion 
of this evaluator that both parents could make acceptable parents 
to the children in question. Neither parent has serious concerns 
of the other parent with regard to their child-rearing capacity. 
Both parents have excellent relationships with their extended 
families, and this provides consistent emotional nurturing to 
the children. Both are seen by their therapists as having no 
serious emotional maladjustment problems. 
Although Mr. Erwinfs plans are to remain in the family home 
providing the continuity of care these children desperately need, 
Mrs. Erwin is planning to move to Price to a home which could 
adequately meet the children's needs in the immediate future. 
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Once established in Price she would also be in a position to 
provide a stable, secure environment. Both parents would 
depend on the grandmothers for back-up ch|ild care when they 
were out of the home due to employment or education. 
As previously mentioned, Mrs. Erwin's plans are to attend 
C.E.U. in hopes of completing classes in business in a short 
amount of time so she could obtain employment to provide for 
her family. She is presently working at a convenience store 
in Green River. This would not provide h|er with adequate income. 
Mr. Erwin is in partnership in a construction company based 
in Green River. Although his employment provides a substantial 
income to support his family, this business requires out-of-town 
commitments. Mr. Erwin states that he will not have to leave 
town to work. In discussing the practicality of this arrangement, 
Mr. Erwin1s partner feels that it is highly unlikely Mr. Erwin 
would be able to work from Green River for the majority of the 
time. This may necessitate arrangements like those made in 
the past, such as coming home on weekends or every other weekend. 
Mr. Erwin claims that he would change occupations if need be. 
This evaluator questions the commitment tlo this statement. 
It is clear that each parent can provide [certain benefits and 
that each parent has a psychological bonqing with the children. 
I believe that the two youngest children, however, are closer 
with Mrs. Erwin. This is also consistent with the needs paramount 
with children of these ages. Kara and Nick have been with 
Mrs. Erwin since February and, in addition, she was seen by the 
majority of the references as the primary caretaker for all of 
the children prior to the separation. She has been providing 
them with continuity of care and affection. Although I feel 
Stacie could successfully live with either parent, I feel her 
bond with Kara is important to both girls. At this point in 
time, Lance is refusing to visit with his Mother because of 
feelings he has regarding the separation. I believe he should 
deal with those emotions immediately. However, at this point 
in time, placing Lance with his Father is in his best interest. 
Lance's strong desire to be with his Father (and Grandfather) 
cannot be ignored. All indications suggest that his strong 
feelings of attachment for his Father and Grandfather are based 
on positive, satisfying past relationships. To separate Lance 
from these relationships would now create much emotional distress 
for him. 
However, I believe that if Lance is allowed to ignore dealing 
with the issues surrounding he and his Mdther's present 
relationship this may create irreparable harm weakening the 
mother-child bond. Thus, I recommend that Lance and Mrs. Erwin 
enter therapy to deal with these feelings. In addition, should 
Mr. Erwin1s employment take him away front home, I feel it would 




The relationship between the siblings should be protected, 
They are very important to each other. Regular, frequent 
visits should continue. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
1. Mrs. Erwin continue to have custody of Nicholas and 
Kara. In addition, Stacie should also be placed with her. 
2. Mr. Erwin continue to have Lance. However, if Mr. Erwinfs 
employment takes him away from home for extended periods 
of time, Lance should be placed with Mrs. Erwin. 
3. Lance and Mrs. Erwin should be involved in therapy to 
address the friction between them. 
4. Visitation should occur as often as feasible, with 
extended summer vacations occurring to bring the 
children together. 
